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ABSTRACT
Although the Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA)
was signed in January 2004, it has not substantially contributed to the
expansion of regional trade among its contracting states. This article
shows how a number of bilateral preferential trade agreements (PTAs)
between SAFTA parties act as formidable stumbling blocks against the
expansion of intra-SAFTA trade and must be abolished. It critically
analyzes SAFTA’s constraints, including areas that SAFTA over- and
under-regulates, that militate against the expansion of intra-SAFTA
trade. Finally, it advocates that SAFTA must be more ambitious in its
scope by adding provisions that will help attract foreign direct
investment (FDI) and build coalitions for World Trade Organization
(WTO) negotiations.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2004, the member states of the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC)1 agreed to establish a South Asian Free
Trade Area (SAFTA).2 However, this agreement has not substantially
contributed to the expansion of regional trade among its contracting
states. First, this article critically assesses how individual trade
agreements between two countries, known as bilateral preferential trade
agreements (PTAs), undermine SAFTA’s trade liberalization initiative.
Second, it identifies SAFTA’s textual limitations and suggests several
amendments that would address those limitations. Third, it recommends
ways for the contracting parties to attract Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) and take up concerted positions in World Trade Organization
(WTO) negotiations to elicit better results for the region. Fourth, it
analyzes the prospect of trade proliferation among the member countries
in trade services. Finally, this article discusses SAFTA’s implications to
trade between SAFTA members and third parties.
II. THE BILATERAL PTA QUANDARY BETWEEN SAFTA
CONTRACTING PARTIES
Bilateral PTAs create major obstacles to trade proliferation between
SAFTA contracting parties under the auspices of the SAARC. Like
SAFTA, these bilateral PTAs are authorized under the Enabling Clause
of the WTO.3 Though the liberalization schemes of these PTAs are not as
comprehensive as many of those created by economically advanced
countries, they do offer certain trade benefits that SAFTA does not. The
tariff liberalization schemes in many of these bilateral agreements are
more ambitious than in SAFTA, so there is a tendency for countries to
trade under bilateral PTAs instead of using SAFTA to increase trade.
For relatively small countries, the incentive to support SAFTA
drastically diminishes when they receive preferential access to India’s
market through a bilateral PTA. Indeed, any business that gains from
1
The current SAARC member states are: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives,
Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. SAARC, http://www.saarc-sec.org (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
2
Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), Jan. 6, 2004, art. 2, available at
http://www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/saftaagreement.pdf (SAARC) [hereinafter SAFTA]. Afghanistan
became a party to SAFTA in 2007. Declaration of the Fourteenth SAARC Summit, Apr. 3-4, 2007, ¶
2, available at http://www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/Summit Declarations/14 - New Delhi, 14th
Summit 3-4 April 2007.pdf.
3
World Trade Organization Decision, Differential and More Favourable Treatment
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, ¶ 1, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/enabling_e.pdf.
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preferential access under a bilateral PTA to a substantial market in
another member country is likely to lobby its government against trade
liberalization under SAFTA. When liberalization occurs under SAFTA,
competition from producers of other SAFTA contracting parties
inexorably follows. As such, bilateral PTAs create an incentive for
businesses that works against trade liberalization under SAFTA. To what
extent their mercantilist interests constrain SAFTA depends on their
political clout and lobbying capacities, but as a group they are a
stumbling force against SAFTA. The fact that some goods featured on
the concessions list of bilateral PTAs are also featured on the sensitive
list under SAFTA bolsters the conjecture that their purpose on the
sensitive list is protectionist.
Bilateral PTAs provide many benefits to South Asian countries that
SAFTA currently does not, such as: 1) better market access, 2) faster
tariff reduction schedules, 3) discrimination benefits, 4) restricted nontariff barriers, and 5) more liberal rules of origin. This section examines
each of these five benefits for the purpose of illustrating the need for
SAFTA to include similar benefits to attract more support from its
members.
A. Bilateral PTAs Offer Better Market Access
Compared to SAFTA, bilateral PTAs between SAFTA contracting
parties offer better market access opportunities. This is in part because
individual countries’ sensitive or negative lists of products in PTAs are
generally much shorter than the same ones in SAFTA. For example,
under the Free Trade Agreement between the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan and the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (PakistanSri Lanka PTA) Pakistan’s sensitive list of products contains 540 tariff
lines,4 which is meager compared to its revised sensitive list under
SAFTA, which contains 1169 tariff lines.5 Under this same PTA, Sri
Lanka’s sensitive list contains 697 tariff lines,6 whereas its revised list
under SAFTA contains 1065 tariff lines.7 Similarly, the India-Sri Lanka
PTA has a shorter sensitive list than SAFTA has. Under the India-Sri
4

Pakistan Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement, Pak.-Sri Lanka, Aug. 1, 2002, SRI LANKA DEP’T
COMMERCE, available at http://www.doc.gov.lk/web/pakissrilanka_freetrade.php (follow “Duty
Concessions” hyperlink then under “(Annex A)” follow “Attachment I” hyperlink) [hereinafter
Pakistan-Sri Lanka PTA].
5
Revised Sensitive Lists Under SAFTA, SAARC SECRETARIAT, http://www.saarcsec.org/main.php?t=2.1.6 (last visited Oct. 28, 2010); Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of
Commerce,
Bangladesh
Regional
and
Bilateral
Trade
http://www.mincom.gov.bd/reg_bil_trade.php (last visited Nov. 28, 2010).
6
Pakistan-Sri Lanka PTA, supra note 4 (follow “Duty Concessions” hyperlink then under
“(Annex B)” follow “Attachment I” hyperlink).
7
Revised Sensitive Lists Under SAFTA, supra note 5.
OF
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Lanka PTA, India has a sensitive list of 431 tariff lines8 compared to 863
tariff lines for developing countries and 480 tariff lines for Least
Developed Countries (LDCs)9 under SAFTA.
Noticeably, the discriminatory aspect of these two bilateral PTAs is
not limited to SAFTA’s developing contracting parties but also extends
to the LDC contracting parties. This ends up benefiting the bilateral PTA
contracting parties at the expense of SAFTA’s LDC contracting parties.
Conversely, under SAFTA, contracting parties have undertaken to grant
special treatment to the LDC contracting parties.10 Under SAFTA, LDC
contracting parties are also accorded a wider time frame to liberalize
their tariffs. However, under the Pakistan-Sri Lanka PTA each country
immediately benefits by providing a shorter sensitive list of products,
granting each other better market access than they grant their LDC
counterparts under SAFTA. Similarly, under the India-Sri Lanka PTA,
India offers Sri Lanka better market access to a developing SAFTA
contracting party than it offers to LDC contracting parties under SAFTA.
SAFTA Article 13 plainly provides that its provisions will not apply to
any preference that the contracting parties have granted or may grant to
each other or any third parties outside of the SAFTA framework. Hence,
more favorable treatment to developing contracting parties under these
bilateral PTAs would not amount to de jure violation of any obligations
under SAFTA. Nonetheless, these dealings vitiate SAFTA’s fundamental
principle of special treatment of LDC contracting parties.
Even when a bilateral PTA between SAFTA contracting parties has
low trade coverage in terms of number of tariff lines, the products that
are covered are likely to have considerable negative practical
implications for other contracting parties. For example, in the IndiaAfghanistan PTA, Afghanistan offers India concessions only on eight
goods and receives reciprocal concessions on thirty-eight goods.11
However, two of the eight products on which Afghanistan offers

8
Indo Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement, India-Sri Lanka, Dec. 28, 1998, SRI LANKA DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, http://www.doc.gov.lk/web/indusrilanka_freetrade.php (follow “Duty Concessions”
hyperlink then under “Annex A” follow “01 Annex D(I)” hyperlink) [hereinafter India-Sri Lanka
PTA].
9
SAARC LDCs include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, and Nepal. See United
Nations Least Developed Country List, http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/62/ (last visited Oct.
26, 2010).
10
SAFTA, supra note 2, art. 11.
11
Preferential Trade Agreement between the Republic of India and the Transitional Islamic
State of Afghanistan, India-Afg., Mar. 6, 2003, Annexures A & B, INDIA DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
http://commerce.nic.in/trade/international_ta_indafg.asp [hereinafter India-Afghanistan PTA].
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concessions are on Afghanistan’s SAFTA sensitive list of goods.12 Items
such as apples, caraway seeds, dried apricots, grapes, linseed, sesame
seeds, shelled walnuts, unshelled walnuts, plums and mulberries, and
watermelons are items on which India offers concessions to Afghanistan.
However, all of these goods are on India’s sensitive list for LDCs under
SAFTA.13
The divergence in the sensitive list of the India-Afghanistan PTA
and SAFTA may be explained in one of two ways: either concessions
were not requested by other contracting parties or they were placed on
the sensitive list for protectionist purposes. As tariff concessions are
outcomes of negotiations, it may be that the other SAFTA contracting
parties do not have any significant export interests in these products in
the Indian or Afghan markets. Therefore, no demand for concessions
may have been placed on them by the remaining SAFTA contracting
parties. However, a PTA’s sensitive list generally denotes the presence of
a domestic industry and competitive exporters in partner countries.
Therefore, a more plausible explanation is that these items are placed on
the sensitive list for the protectionist purpose of restraining imports from
the remaining contracting parties.
One can argue that in some cases exclusive concessions in a bilateral
PTA between two SAFTA contracting parties will not impair other
SAFTA contracting parties’ trading interests because there may be no
other SAFTA producers of like goods among SAFTA contracting parties.
However, when a product subject to preferential treatment in a bilateral
PTA is placed on SAFTA’s sensitive list of goods this possibility is very
slim. Because bilateral PTAs have better overall market access than
SAFTA, bilateral PTAs will continue to impede SAFTA’s
implementation.
B. Bilateral PTAs Provide Faster Tariff Reduction Schedules
Bilateral PTAs cover not only a wider variety of products than those
under SAFTA, but in some cases they also have a shorter tariff
liberalization schedule.14 Under SAFTA, tariffs will be reduced to
between zero and five percent by 2016.15 However, when this is
compared to the Pakistan-Sri Lanka PTA, the PTA has the advantage.
12
Id. Annexure A (the two products are cement clinkers and white cement); E-mail Attachment
from Subash C. Sharma, SAARC Econ., Trade, Fin. & Transp. Div., to editor (Oct. 24, 2010, 22:00
MDT) (on file with publisher).
13
India-Afghanistan PTA, supra note 12, Annexure B; Revised Sensitive Lists Under SAFTA,
supra note 5.
14
A tariff liberalization schedule is the schedule by which tariffs are reduced over time as
agreed upon by the Contracting Parties. See SAFTA, supra note 2, art. 7.
15
SAFTA, supra note 2, art. 7(1)(d).
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Pakistan has eliminated tariffs altogether on 206 tariff lines for imports
from Sri Lanka and Sri Lanka has eliminated tariffs on 102 tariff lines
for imports from Pakistan.16 The India-Sri Lanka PTA also has more
accelerated targets for tariff elimination than SAFTA has. Under their
PTA, India has offered Sri Lankan producers duty-free access in 4233
tariff lines and Sri Lanka has offered Indian producers free access in
4024 tariff lines.17 Shorter lists of sensitive products and shorter tariff
liberalization schedules offer countries better market access opportunities
through current bilateral PTAs than those offered through SAFTA.
C. Bilateral PTAs Create Discrimination Through Reverse
Market Access
Not only are tariff reductions and product coverage under SAFTA
less generous than some bilateral PTAs among contracting parties, but
PTAs also give extensive benefits in other forms. The India-Maldives
PTA, for instance, does not provide for any preferential access in terms
of tariff cuts but does allow the Maldives to import products like river
sand, eggs, potatoes, and onions that are subject to export bans in India.18
This appears to be a measure to boost India’s agricultural export to the
Maldives, but it does not give Indian producers any preference to the
market of the Maldives. Therefore, it may seem that other SAFTA
members do not stand to lose economically since they are not ipso facto
subject to any market-entry barriers in the Maldives. However, the
Maldives is being given an option of a steady source of needed supplies
that otherwise would be unavailable to it from India. India aside, every
member of SAFTA is a net food-importing country.19 Hence, as net foodimporting countries, a firm and steady option for importing these food
products from India may be welfare enhancing for them, at least in the
short or medium term until their own domestic agricultural production
increases to meet local demands. Thus, bilateral PTAs also give
16

Pakistan-Sri Lanka PTA, supra note 4 (follow “Duty Concessions” hyperlink then under
“(Annex A)” follow “Attachment II” hyperlink, and under “(Annex B)” follow “Attachment II”
hyperlink).
17
India-Sri Lanka PTA, supra note 8 (follow “Duty Concessions” hyperlink then under
“Annex A” follow “02 Annex E” hyperlink and under “Annex B” follow “02 Annex F1” and “03
Annex FII” hyperlinks).
18
Trade Agreement Between the Gov’t of the Republic of India and the Gov’t of the Republic
of Maldives, India-Maldives, art. VIII – IX, Mar. 31, 1981, INDIA DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
http://www.commerce.nic.in/trade/maldives.pdf.
19
Comm. on Agric., WTO List of Net Food-Importing Developing Countries for the Purposes
of the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the
REFORM Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries,
G/AG/5/Rev.8 (Mar. 22, 2005).
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extensive benefits in other forms such as the creation of discrimination
through reverse market access commitments, which significantly benefit
some parties.
D. Bilateral PTAs Restrict Non-tariff Barriers
Whereas SAFTA does not have a binding provision for eliminating
or reducing non-tariff barriers, bilateral PTAs have specific provisions in
place. For example, the India-Nepal PTA provides that, subject to few
exceptions, all goods of Indian or Nepalese origin are free from any
quantitative, licensing, or permit restrictions by either of the contracting
parties.20 This gives Nepalese producers an edge over their competitors
from other SAFTA contracting parties.
E.

Bilateral PTAs Provide More Liberal Rules of Origin

Another difference between a PTA and SAFTA is that the rules of
origin in bilateral PTAs are more liberal than the rules of origin of
SAFTA. Under the India-Sri Lanka PTA, a product not wholly produced
in one of the two countries is eligible for preferential tariff treatment,
provided that the inputs from third parties or of undetermined origin do
not exceed sixty-five percent of the final product and that final
processing occurs in the exporting contracting party’s territory.21 It also
requires that the final product be in a different tariff line than any of the
inputs from third parties.22 This change in tariff line requirement in
SAFTA is identical, but in the case of developing countries SAFTA rules
of origin permit only sixty percent of third party inputs.23 Therefore, the
producers of India or Sri Lanka who use third party inputs between sixty
to sixty-five percent would have to resort to the India-Sri Lanka PTA if
they want to enjoy the preferential tariff rate. The same scenario would
apply to trade between Pakistan and Sri Lanka because the Pakistan-Sri
Lanka PTA rules of origin also allow up to sixty-five percent third party
inputs and require change in tariff line.24
Notably, bilateral PTA rule of origin cumulative provisions have
different standards than SAFTA. The Pakistan-Sri Lanka PTA’s
cumulative rule of origin provides that the exporting country’s value
20
Revised Indo-Nepal Treaty of Trade, India-Nepal, art. II, Oct. 27, 2009, INDIA DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, http://www.commerce.nic.in/trade/nepal.pdf [hereinafter India-Nepal PTA].
21
India-Sri Lanka PTA, supra note 8, r.7(a) (follow “Rules of Origin Requirements (Annex
C)” hyperlink).
22
Id. r.7(a)-(b).
23
Revised Sensitive Lists Under SAFTA, supra note 5, Annex IV, r.8(a)(ii) (follow “Rules of
Origin” hyperlink).
24
Pakistan-Sri Lanka PTA, supra note 4, r.8(a)-(b) (follow “Rules of Origin Requirements
(Annex C)” hyperlink then “View Full Text”).

7

WINTER 2010

SAFTA

addition must not be less than twenty-five percent of the final product,
and that the value addition from the other contracting party be at least ten
percent. In addition, the change in tariff line rule applies.25 The
cumulative rule of origin of the India-Sri Lanka PTA has identical rules
on this point.26 Although SAFTA’s cumulative rules of origin only
require twenty percent domestic value addition, they have a thirty
percent value addition requirement from other contracting parties.27
Hence, producers in India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka who want to benefit
from a preferential tariff will source inputs under their bilateral PTA,
rather than SAFTA, since it requires less value addition from other
countries to meet the threshold. This hurts the trading interests of the
remaining SAFTA contracting parties.
III. SAFTA’S STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS
SAFTA suffers from many areas of over- or under-regulation. Many
of these structural constraints are impeding the member countries from
trading with each other. These include: 1) too many items are included
on the sensitive products list, 2) the rules restraining trade remedy
measures are too minimal, 3) there is insufficient regulation on non-tariff
barriers, 4) there is an absence of tangible measures for trade facilitation,
5) measures need to be taken to increase human capital among LDC
contracting parties, and 6) no current regulation covers export control.
Additionally, SAFTA should be amended to reduce anti-dumping
measures and discourage anti-dumping investigation to increase regional
trade among contracting states. This section will examine these
impediments and suggest some possible resolutions.
A. Matters That SAFTA Over-Regulates
1)

SAFTA’s sensitive goods lists are too extensive

Under SAFTA, the lists of sensitive goods of individual contracting
parties are over-inclusive and include important items that have potential
for sub-regional trade. Most of the main export items of the LDC
contracting parties are included in the sensitive list of products of their
partner countries. Afghanistan’s primary exports are dried fruits, carpets,
25

Id. r.8(b), 9 (follow “Rules of Origin Requirements (Annex C)” hyperlink then “View Full

Text”).
26
India-Sri Lanka PTA, supra note 8, r.7(b), 8 (follow “Rules of Origin Requirements (Annex
C)” hyperlink).
27
Revised Sensitive Lists Under SAFTA, supra note 5, Annex IV, r.9(b) (follow “Rules of
Origin” hyperlink).
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fresh fruits, wool, cotton, and vegetables.28 Among the main exports
from Bangladesh are woven garments, handicrafts, jute, pharmaceuticals,
tea, ceramic products, and finished vessels.29 Bhutan’s main exports are
chemical products, metal, wood, processed food, mineral products,
textiles, stones, cement, and asbestos products.30 Marine fisheries,
particularly tuna, and clothing items are the Maldives’ only notable
merchandise exports.31 Nepal’s primary merchandise exports are carpets,
clothing, grain, herbal treatments and oils, readymade garments, and jute
goods.32 Because these countries have limited export baskets, SAFTA
grants them only limited market access benefits.
Goods with trade potential on sensitive lists also hinder trade by
SAFTA’s developing contracting parties. For example, there is a
possibility for welfare-improving trade creation between India and
Pakistan in wheat.33 There is also potential for poultry and other
livestock exports from Pakistan to India.34 However, many of these
products with natural trade prospects between contracting parties are
included in other countries’ sensitive lists. Because of this, SAFTA’s
sensitive list of goods is inhibiting the natural proliferation of trade
among its members.
2) Impact of over-inclusive sensitive lists
The long list of sensitive products is an attempt to insulate domestic
markets from sub-regional competition. However, official trade barriers
between SAFTA contracting parties do not always succeed in preventing
movement of goods across borders. Instead, they merely encourage a
shift in the modes of border crossing from legal channels to illegal
smuggling. For example, if Bangladesh lowered its tariff under SAFTA,
the comparative benefit of smuggling sugar from India into Bangladesh
28
Afg. Chamber of Commerce, Exports, http://www.afghanchamber.com/about/Exports.htm
(last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
29
Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review of Bangladesh: Report by the Secretariat,
¶¶ 7, 26, WT/TPR/S/168/Rev.1 (Nov. 15, 2006); Md. Joynal Abedin, Regional Trade and Economic
Cooperation in South Asia, THE DAILY STAR, Oct. 8, 2009, available at
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=108709.
30
Bhutan
Gov’t,
Foreign
Relation
and
Trade,
http://www.bhutan.gov.bt/government/abt_foreign.php (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
31
See Ministry of Econ. Dev., Maldives, International Trade: Regional,
http://www.trade.gov.mv/?lid=23 (last visited Oct. 26, 2010); Trade Policy Review Body, Trade
Policy Review of Maldives: Report by the Secretariat, ¶ 12, WT/TPR/S/221/Rev.1 (Nov. 5, 2009).
32
Working Party on the Accession of Nepal, May 22, 2000, Sept. 12, 2002, Aug. 15, 2003, ¶
85, WT/ACC/NPL/16 (Aug. 28, 2003); Nepal Exports, http://www.nepal.com/exports/ (last visited
Oct. 26, 2010).
33
Garry Pursell et al., Asia, in DISTORTIONS TO AGRICULTURAL INCENTIVES IN ASIA 339, 349
(Kym Anderson & Will Martin eds., 2009).
34
Id.
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would likely decrease and more would be imported legally.35 While the
price of sugar paid by Bangladeshi consumers may not change, the
government would benefit from the potentially increased tariff revenue.
If the tariff were removed altogether, the government’s revenue would
disappear; but consumers would benefit from lower-priced sugar. As
such, continuing to maintain high trade barriers in these sectors does not
appear to be economically justifiable even from a mercantilist point of
view.
In response to consumer demand, similar illegal trade occurs
between India and Pakistan which cannot be prevented by an overinclusive SAFTA’s sensitive goods list. Alternatively, goods shipped by
legal means are sometimes routed through third-party countries to
circumvent trade restrictions. These goods have a value of around half a
billion per annum and include cloth, textiles, pharmaceuticals,
machinery, cosmetics, jewelry, and tires.36 Due to the increased cost of
transportation and customs duties paid to government authorities in thirdparty countries, this shipping process increases the prices of goods that
consumers have to pay. Reducing the number of items on the sensitive
list to reduce these practices promotes welfare and trade within SAFTA
without hurting legitimate trading interests of third parties.
B. Matters That SAFTA Under-Regulates
1) SAFTA provides minimal trade remedy measure restrictions
SAFTA does very little to address the adoption of trade remedy
measures. Any time there is a significant volume of exports from a
SAFTA member, it is possible for the importing country to lobby its
government for a suspension of preferential concessions on that good.
SAFTA does nothing to constrain adoption of anti-dumping37 or
countervailing measures38 other than a largely ineffectual clause
35
See generally Garry Pursell, Smuggling and the Economic Welfare Consequences of an FTA:
A Case Study of India- Bangladesh Trade in Sugar (Austl. S. Asia Res. Ctr., Austl. Nat’l Univ.,
ASARC
Working
Paper
No.
2007/5,
2007),
available
at
http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/asarc/WP2007_05.pdf (arguing, inter alia, that the smuggling of goods
between Bangladesh and India has economic consequences that “can be analyzed following normal
principles”).
36
Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review of Pakistan, Report by the Secretariat, at
49, WT/TPR/S/193/Rev.1 (May 20, 2008).
37
“If a company exports a product at a price lower than the price it normally charges on its
own home market, it is said to be ‘dumping’ the product.” WTO, Anti-dumping,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
38
Countervailing measures may lead to an “extra duty (‘countervailing duty’) on subsidized
imports that are found to be hurting domestic producers.” WTO, Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/scm_e.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
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requiring contracting parties to pay special regard to LDCs and to
consider accepting price undertakings offered by LDC exporters.39 If an
investigation for anti-dumping is commenced, in the absence of an
express obligation to accept a price undertaking from LDC exporters,
this soft rule is unlikely to have any effect.
Among SAFTA contracting parties, India is a frequent user of antidumping measures.40 According to its reports to the WTO, India initiated
596 anti-dumping investigations and imposed anti-dumping measures in
419 of those cases from January 1995 through December 2009.41
Pakistan also occasionally resorts to anti-dumping measures; over the
same period it initiated fifty-three investigations and imposed measures
in twenty-four cases.42 It has imposed anti-dumping measures on
Bangladeshi and Nepalese exporters but not to Sri Lankan exporters.43
With regard to exporters from its SAFTA partners, Pakistan only once
initiated an investigation against Indian exporters—and it imposed antidumping measures on that occasion.44
During that same period there were no reported investigations
initiated and no countervailing measures taken in all intra-SAFTA
trade.45 This is consistent with the current global trend. The reports to the
WTO during the above period show that there were only 245
countervailing investigations initiated and 139 countervailing measures
taken by the WTO member states.46 These are paltry figures compared to
39

See SAFTA, supra note 2, art. 11(a).
See Ctr. for the Analysis of Reg’l Integration at Sussex, Qualitative Analysis of a Potential
Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and India: Annex 1: Analysis of Trade
Production Structures and Implications for Non-Tariff Barriers, Services and Regulatory Parts of an
FTA, at 11, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/july/tradoc_135346.pdf (last visited Oct. 26,
2010).
41
See WTO, Anti-dumping Initiations: By Reporting Member from 01/01/95 to 31/12/09,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/ad_init_rep_member_e.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2010)
[hereinafter Anti-dumping Initiations]; WTO, Anti-dumping Measures: By Reporting Member from
01/01/95 to 31/12/09, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/ad_meas_rep_member_e.pdf (last
visited Oct. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Anti-dumping Measures] (these include anti-dumping
investigations against Bangladeshi, Nepalese, and Sri Lankan exporters and show India imposed
anti-dumping measures against exporters from Bangladesh and Nepal).
42
Anti-dumping Initiations, supra note 41; Anti-dumping Measures, supra note 41.
43
WTO, AD Initiations: Reporting Member vs Exporting Country from 01/01/95 to: 31/12/08,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/ad_init_rep_exp_e.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2010);
WTO, AD Measures: Reporting Member vs Exporting Country from 01/01/95 to31/12/08,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/ad_meas_rep_exp_e.pdf (last visited 12 Mar. 12, 2010).
44
See
Pakistan
Nat’l
Tariff
Comm’n,
Anti-dumping
Investigations,
http://www.ntc.gov.pk/adint.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
45
See WTO, Countervailing Initiations: Reporting Member vs Exporting Country 01/01/1995 31/12/2009,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/cvd_init_rep_exp_e.pdf
[hereinafter
Countervailing Initiations]; WTO, Countervailing Measures: Reporting Member vs Exporting
Country 01/01/95 - 31/12/09, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/cvd_meas_rep_exp_e.pdf
[hereinafter Countervailing Measures].
46
Countervailing Initiations, supra note 45; Countervailing Measures, supra note 45.
40

11

WINTER 2010

SAFTA

the 3675 anti-dumping investigations initiated and 2374 anti-dumping
measures taken during the period of January 1995 through December
2009.47
The prevailing low incidence of countervailing measures in intraSAARC trade might partially be explained by the limited economic
capacity of governments of the contracting parties to subsidize exports.
However, the generally low incidence of anti-dumping measures in intraSAFTA trade may not be a good indicator of what may occur over time
as internal trade increases. Arguably, the low incidence of anti-dumping
measures is more a reflection of the low export volume of SAFTA
contracting parties to the Indian market than an illustration of India’s
firm commitment to refrain from anti-dumping measures against its
partner countries. Since anti-dumping measures generally target the most
competitive producers, the relative lack of anti-dumping or
countervailing duties may be explicable by the relatively low volume of
intra-regional trade.
The adoption of anti-dumping duties between SAFTA members once
led to the invoking of the WTO Dispute Settlement procedure.48 On
January 28, 2004, Bangladesh requested consultations with India
regarding an anti-dumping measure imposed by India on imports of lead
acid batteries from Bangladesh.49 Bangladesh claimed, inter alia, that the
anti-dumping investigation by Indian authorities was initiated even
though the applicant did not establish that it represented the domestic
industry. The investigation proceeded against the Bangladeshi exporters
even though the value of the exports was negligible.50 The authorities of
the two countries reached a mutually acceptable solution as India
withdrew the anti-dumping measure.51 However, this case clearly shows
that anti-dumping actions are an important issue in intra-SAFTA trade.
Most likely, the dispute in this case was settled before proceeding to a
panel because of the public attention it received. It was the first and only
case thus far to have an LDC member country of the WTO invoke the
Dispute Settlement Body. Future cases may not be settled so easily.
The vast scope of trade remedy measures in internal trade is a
troublesome problem that SAFTA fails to adequately address. If the
contracting parties continue to use the flexibility of trade remedy
47

Countervailing Initiations, supra note 45; Countervailing Measures, supra note 45.
See WTO, India—Anti-dumping Measure on Batteries from Bangladesh, WT/DS306/1 (Feb.
2, 2004), available at http://www.wtocenter.org.tw/SmartKMS/fileviewer?id=41409 [hereinafter
India—Anti-dumping].
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
48
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measures in intra-SAFTA trade, it will effectively nullify the tariff
concessions under SAFTA. Assuming the contracting parties cannot
agree to dispense with these measures in their internal trade, they should
nonetheless take measures such as applying a different threshold for
using anti-dumping rules. This would provide some relief to intraSAFTA exporters in cases where anti-dumping investigations would be
conducted against third parties, thereby ensuring that any trade
concessions offered under SAFTA would not easily succumb to
protectionist impulses.
2) SAFTA insufficiently addresses non-tariff barriers
As the role of tariff barriers in protection of domestic industries
declines, nontariff barriers are increasingly becoming the tools of choice
to serve protectionist obsessions.52 These nontariff barriers include
quality control of the products and the ease with which a product can be
transported across country lines.53 Hence, the proliferation of both tariff
barriers and nontariff barriers has endangered the meaningful increase of
trade by a PTA. Unless the nontariff barriers are effectively dismantled
among contracting parties in a PTA, the benefit derived from tariff
reduction schemes will be minimal.54 Dismayingly, SAFTA provides
inadequate regulations of nontariff barriers in intra-SAFTA trade. Under
SAFTA Article 7(4), the contracting parties’ obligation is limited to
notification of their non-tariff and para-tariff barriers to the SAFTA
Committee of Experts (COE).55 The COE can review these notifications,
scrutinize their conformity with the relevant WTO provisions, and
recommend the abolition of those measures or the execution of those
measures in the least trade-restrictive manner possible.
However, even if the COE issues recommendations, SAFTA is
conspicuously silent on the contracting parties’ obligations with regard to
the COE’s recommendations. Furthermore, the assessment criteria for the
COE are the relevant WTO rules; therefore, SAFTA does not give the
contracting parties who are WTO members any additional rights beyond
what they already have, such as raising any WTO-inconsistent nontariff
barriers to the WTO’s dispute settlement system.
52
See generally Peace News Team, SAARC: ‘Non-Tariff Barriers Must Go,’ AMAN NEWS,
Apr. 4, 2010, http://amannews.com/english/2010/04/saarc-‘non-tariff-barriers-must-go’/ (reporting
that SAARC has urged its member countries to reduce the amount of nontariff barriers in order to
facilitate direct trade).
53
See generally John C. Beghin, Nontariff Barriers, (Ctr. for Agric. & Rural Dev., Iowa State
Univ.,
Working
Paper
No.
06-WP
438,
2006),
available
at
http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/DBS/PDFFiles/06wp438.pdf (describing the general types
of nontariff barriers and their economic effects).
54
See generally Peace News Team, supra note 52.
55
SAFTA, supra note 2, art. 7(4).
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To strengthen intra-SAFTA trade, the contracting parties must tackle
nontariff barriers to intra-SAFTA trade more effectively. The national
product standards of each country may serve legitimate purposes, such as
implementing public policies to ensure product safety, but they also
inhibit importation. Disparate product standards among the countries
may also significantly restrain the cross-border flow of goods.56 If the
contracting parties can achieve the harmonization of domestic product
standards and recognition of reciprocal certifications as expressed in
Article 8(a) of SAFTA, intra-SAFTA imports would be processed at a
faster pace. By signing the Agreement on the Establishment of South
Asian Regional Standards Organization (SARSO) that provides for the
establishment of a South Asian Standards Organization (Organization)57
the contracting parties have taken a step in the right direction.
The main objectives of the Organization are the harmonization of
national standards of the SAARC countries to create a freer flow of
goods and services in the sub-region, and the persuasion of member
countries to use international standards58 through replicating them as
SAARC standards.59 SARSO, which has yet to take force, does not have
rules of procedure and, hence, the extent of its efficacy remains
uncertain. However, given that the proposed Organization is granted full
legal personality,60 it may have sufficient jurisdiction to function
properly and provide a much needed impetus to the promotion of intraSAFTA trade. Furthermore, the Organization may help to lessen
administrative burdens of national customs and standard testing
authorities of the SAARC countries. Therefore, it is evident that
increased regulation on non-tariff barriers will be financially beneficial
to the contracting parties. While tackling nontariff barriers such as tariff
escalation, tariff rate quota, and the abolition of import licensing may be
difficult, the formulation of sub-regional product standards may not be so
daunting.
3) SAFTA should expand coverage of trade in services

56
See John Ravenhill, Fighting Irrelevance: An Economic Community ‘with ASEAN
Characteristics’ 12-13 (Austl. Nat’l Univ. Dep’t of Int’l Relations, Working Paper No. 2007/3,
2007), available at http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ir/pubs/work_papers/07-3.pdf.
57
Agreement on the Establishment of South Asian Regional Standards Organization (SARSO),
art. 1(i), Aug. 3, 2008, http://www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/SARSOAgreement31July2008.doc
(SAARC) [hereinafter SARSO].
58
As published by bodies such as the International Organization for Standardization, the
International Electrotechnical Commission, etc.
59
SARSO, supra note 57, art. 2.
60
Id. art. 1(ii).
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It is very curious that trade in services was not at all covered by
SAFTA until April of this year, when a PTA was signed during a summit
of heads of state.61 Due to the advancement of technology, including
transportation and communication systems, cross-border trade in services
is rapidly expanding. If trade in services had not been included in the
PTA, a substantial percentage of sub-regional trade between the
contracting parties would have been left out of its scope. Presently,
because of their economic factor endowments, the contracting parties
stand a superior chance of enhancing intra-SAFTA trade in services than
in goods.62
The SATIS contracting parties are endowed with a large number of
low skilled or unskilled labor. Therefore, in the WTO negotiations, they
strongly advocate for freer movement of natural persons across borders.
However, the persuasiveness of their argument for liberalization in the
WTO wanes, if the movement of natural persons is not allowed within
the sub-regional framework to at least some degree. To benefit from the
economies of scale, the contracting parties should make the PTA in
services a comprehensive PTA. Furthermore, unlike liberalization in
trade in goods, liberalization in trade in services generally does not entail
any loss of tariff revenue, which should make it easier to liberalize.
However, in view of the dismal experience of the SAFTA’s
liberalization in goods, it is difficult to be sanguine about the prospect of
the depth of market access in the new PTA in services. But the a multo
fortiori of expecting the creation of new liberalization is the undertaking
that the contracting parties have made in paragraph 7 of Annex I to the
SATIS. They have agreed to make liberalization commitments exceeding
their multilateral commitments both in terms of the coverage of sectors
as well as modal improvement in those sectors.
The opening of the market for services under the SATIS could prove
to be crucial as the GATS commitments of the SATIS contracting
parties; except in Nepal, where the commitments are very narrow.
Therefore, any new liberalization commitment can create trade without
raising barriers to third parties. At the WTO, Bangladesh originally made
commitments only in the sub-sector of five star hotel and lodging
services within the broader tourism and travel related services sector63
61
SAARC Agreement on Trade in Services (SATIS), Apr. 29, 2010, available at
http://commerce.nic.in/trade/SAARC Agreement on Trade in Services SATS.pdf [hereinafter
SATIS].
62
See Douglas Jayasekera, Address at the ARTNeT Consultative Meeting on Bridging the
Development Gaps in the GMS: Progress of Liberalization of Trade in Services in SAFTA (June 2,
2009), available at http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/mtg/bridging_s3douglas.pdf.
63
WTO General Agreement in Services, Bangladesh: Schedule of Specific Commitments,
WTO Doc GATS/SC/8 (15 April 1994).
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and subsequently made commitments in telecommunications sector.64
India has made commitments only in around a quarter of the subsectors.65 Even in those sub-sectors which are covered, in most cases,
India has made no commitment. In mode 1, 2, and 4 very little
commitment has been made by India beyond its horizontal commitments.
The Maldives has only made commitments in accounting, auditing and
book-keeping services, computer and related services sub-sectors.66
Pakistan has made GATS commitments in services incidental to
agriculture and forestry, services incidental to mining, engineering
services, computer and related services sectors, research and
development services in natural sciences, telecommunication services,
insurance and insurance related services, banking services, hospital
services and medical and dental service, hotels and restaurants, and travel
agencies and tour operator services.67 Sri Lanka initially made
commitments only in hotel and lodging services and travel agency and
tour operation services sub-sectors of the tourism and travel related
services68
sector
and
later
undertook
commitments
in
telecommunications services and insurance and banking, sub-sectors.69
In the business services sector, Nepalese commitments include legal
services, accounting, auditing and book-keeping services, architectural
services, engineering services, veterinary services, computer and related
services, research and development services, rental and leasing services
without operators, advertising services, market research service and
public opinion polling services, management consulting services,
64
WTO General Agreement in Services, Bangladesh: Schedule of Specific Commitments,
Supplement 1, WTO Doc GATS/SC/8/Suppl.1 (11 April 1997).
65
WTO General Agreement in Services, India: Schedule of Specific Commitments, WTO Doc
GATS/SC/42 (Apr. 15, 1994); WTO General Agreement in Services, India: Schedule of Specific
Commitments, Supplement 1, WTO Doc GATS/SC/42/Suppl.1 (July 28, 1995); WTO General
Agreement in Services, India: Schedule of Specific Commitments, Supplement 2, WTO Doc
GATS/SC/42/Suppl.2 (July 28, 1995).
66
WTO General Agreement in Services, Maldives: Schedule of Specific Commitments, WTO
Doc GATS/SC/101 (Aug. 30, 1995).
67
WTO General Agreement in Services, Pakistan: Schedule of Specific Commitments, WTO
Doc GATS/SC/67 (Apr. 15, 1994); WTO General Agreement in Services, Pakistan: Schedule of
Specific Commitments, Supplement 1, WTO Doc GATS/SC/67.Suppl.1 (July 28, 1995); WTO
General Agreement in Services, Pakistan: Schedule of Specific Commitments, Supplement 2, WTO
Doc GATS/SC/67.Supp2 (Apr. 11, 1997); WTO General Agreement in Services, Pakistan: Schedule
of Specific Commitments, Supplement 2, Revision, WTO Doc GATS/SC/67.Suppl.2/Rev.1 (Feb. 16,
1998); WTO General Agreement in Services, Pakistan: Schedule of Specific Commitments,
Supplement 3, WTO Doc GATS/SC/67.Suppl.3 (Feb. 26, 1998).
68
WTO General Agreement in Services, Sri Lanka: Schedule of Specific Commitments, WTO
Doc GATS/SC/79 (Apr. 15, 1994).
69
WTO General Agreement in Services, Sri Lanka: Schedule of Specific Commitments,
Supplement 1, WTO Doc GATS/SC/79/Suupl.1 (Apr. 11, 1997); WTO General Agreement in
Services, Sri Lanka: Schedule of Specific Commitments, Supplement 2, WTO Doc
GATS/SC/79/Suupl.1 (Feb. 26, 1998).
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technical testing and analysis services.70 In the communication services
sector, it has made commitments in courier services and
telecommunications services sub-sectors.71 It has also made
commitments in different sub-sectors of the other nine broad service
sectors.72 Presumably, Nepal has made significantly more commitments
in WTO service schedule because of the negotiations as part of its
accession in the WTO—an indication of the mercantilist nature of the
WTO accession process that requires LDCs to offer more liberalization
commitments than average developing countries.73 Arguably, this is also
contrary to the spirit of Article XI:2 of the WTO Agreement, which
provides that LDCs would only need to undertake commitments and
concessions to the extent commensurate with their development,
financial, and trade needs or administrative and institutional capabilities.
Two things stand out from the WTO schedule of services of the
SATIS contracting parties. First, there is very little commitment made in
mode 4 except for some provision for temporary entry of natural persons,
high level executives, and technical professionals. Second, various
restrictions, mainly in the form of foreign equity ceilings, apply with
respect to foreign investments under mode 3. Hence, the SATIS
liberalization in these two areas can create trade without hurting third
parties interests. The service schedule of the SATIS contracting parties,
of course, cannot capture the actual barrier to market access as can the
difference between bound and applied tariffs in goods. Applied laws and
regulations in services may well be more liberal than the binding
commitments made in the WTO; nonetheless, the WTO service schedule
is significant as it shows the extent of binding commitments, and any
binding commitments over and above that under the SATIS would give
predictability of access to the sub-regional service providers. The scope
of backtracking being eliminated, there should be impetus for greater
investment that can—in addition to giving consumers more choices—
create jobs.
A significant barrier against mode 4 movements of professionals is
the necessity of recognition of their professional qualifications. The
current provision in the SATIS in this regard is lackluster and worded in
terms of aspiration rather than any binding agreement. In this regard, the
SATIS may take note of the development in the ASEAN. The ASEAN
contracting parties have concluded Mutual Recognition Arrangements
70
WTO General Agreement in Services, The Kingdom of Nepal: Schedule of Specific
Commitments, WTO Doc GATS/SC/139 (Aug. 30, 2004).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Kent Jones, The Political Economy of WTO Accession: The Unfinished Business of
Universal Membership, 8 WORLD TRADE REV. 279, 295-96 (2009).
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(MRAs) that allow the qualifications of professional services suppliers of
one contracting party to be mutually recognized by all the contracting
parties. Currently, they have concluded seven MRAs covering seven
professional services, namely: accountancy, architecture, engineering,
nursing services, dental practitioners, medical practitioners, and
surveying qualifications.74 Under these Agreements, professionals who
fulfill some educational and other minimum requirements in their own
country would be eligible for recognition by the other contracting parties.
The SATIS contracting parties should provide for such concrete
provisions.
4) SAFTA lacks tangible measures for trade facilitation
Tariff and nontariff liberalization needs to be accompanied by
measures to facilitate trade in the sub-region. The member countries have
set high standards for facilitating internal trade but no real enforcement
mechanism has been put in place to achieve it. For example, transit
facilities across the contracting party states would greatly enhance a freer
flow of goods and certain services, especially for the three landlocked
contracting parties of Nepal, Bhutan, and Afghanistan. However, trade
facilitation remains an aspiration with no mechanism in place for its
realization.75 The sub-regional transport arrangements are basically
bilateral deals. For instance, the India-Bhutan PTA allows imported and
exported goods (other than those from India) to and from Bhutan to pass
thorough Indian territories without being subjected to any customs duties
or trade restrictions.76 This agreement also designates specific exit and
entry points in India through which imports and exports of Bhutan can be
74
ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement Framework on Accountancy Services (Feb. 26,
2009), available at http://www.aseansec.org/22225.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2010); ASEAN Mutual
Recognition Arrangement on Architectural Services (Nov. 19, 2007), available at
http://www.aseansec.org/21137.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2010); ASEAN Mutual Recognition
Arrangement
on
Engineering
Services
(Dec.
6,
2006),
available
at
http://www.aseansec.org/18009.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2010); ASEAN Mutual Recognition
Arrangement on Nursing Services (Dec. 8, 2006), available at http://www.aseansec.org/19210.htm
(last visited Sept. 18, 2010); ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Dental Practitioners (Feb.
26, 2009), available at http://www.aseansec.org/22228.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2010); ASEAN
Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Medical Practitioners (Feb. 26, 2009), available at
http://www.aseansec.org/22231.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2010); ASEAN Framework Arrangement
for the Mutual Recognition of Surveying Qualifications (Nov. 19, 2007), available at
http://www.aseansec.org/21139.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2010).
75
See Governor Stresses Need for Trade Facilitation at SAARC Seminar Inaugural,
Daijiworld.com,
Aug.
5,
2010,
http://www.daijiworld.com/news/news_disp.asp?n_id=82686&n_tit=Governor+Stresses+Need+for+
Trade+Facilitation+at+SAARC+Seminar+Inaugural++.
76
See Agreement on Trade, Commerce and Transit between the Government of the Republic of
India and the Royal Government of Bhutan, India-Bhutan, art. V, July 28, 2006, India Dep’t of
Commerce, available at http://www.commerce.nic.in/trade/bhutan.pdf.
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transshipped.77 In a similar vein, a transit facility is also in place between
Nepal and India with designated entry and exit points in Indian territories
for goods to move to and from Nepal.78
The legal framework for cross-border movement of goods and
services can only have a moderate impact on trade flow unless a physical
infrastructure to support that trade flow exists—namely, an efficient
transportation network capable of facilitating speedy movement. It is
crucial that the contracting parties have an efficient network of water,
road, railway, and air transportation—all modes of transportation
available to assist freer and smoother movement of goods and services
throughout the sub-region. The transit framework within the sub-region
needs to cover all SAFTA contracting parties and it must be dealt with in
the SAARC’s institutional framework. Bilateral transit arrangements
cannot substitute for a sub-region wide integrated transport framework.
Although there is concern about potentially increased movement of
terrorists across borders if the sub-regional borders are more open, these
concerns seem to exaggerate the threat. It is not clear that a sub-region
wide transit network would increase the threat of terrorism. Moreover,
protected borders do not appear to have been able to prevent the
movement of terrorists in the past.
Relaxing travel and visa restrictions to facilitate movement of natural
persons across the sub-region would create more trade in transportation
and tourism services. The contracting parties have recognized the
importance of the promotion of sub-regional tourism79 but no measure to
facilitate cross-border movement of natural persons has yet been taken.
Since trade is not a static phenomenon, there might be unexplored areas
of trade and investment between the contracting parties. Relaxing travel
restrictions may therefore also encourage business contacts within the
sub-region, which in turn could pave the way for the discovery of new
areas of trade and exploration of potential industries for joint venture or
direct foreign investment flow. To facilitate this, contracting parties
ought to take prompt steps to facilitate the creation of business visitor
visas for entrepreneurs from the other contracting parties.
5) SAFTA does not address how it will develop capacity building of
LDC contracting parties
Annex II of SAFTA provides a detailed list of areas where the
developing contracting parties have vowed to assist LDC contracting
77

Id. at 4 (Protocol with Reference to Article V).
India-Nepal PTA, supra note 20, Annexure A.
79
See Declaration of the Fifteenth SAARC Summit, Aug. 2-3, ¶ 24, 2008, http://www.saarcsec.org/SAARC-Summit/7/ (follow “Fifteenth SAARC Summit” hyperlink).
78
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parties in providing technical assistance for building trade capacity. The
identified areas include training and human resources development in
trade; development of trade-related institutions; development of trade
negotiating skills; development of tariff-related laws; customs procedure;
trade policy reforms; and assistance in improvement of national capacity
building in different WTO agreements and promotion of exports.80
However, SAFTA is silent as to the mode of implementation of these
laudable objectives, as well as the source of the logistics to realize them.
Obviously, this is frustrating for LDCs because the existence of these
objectives creates legitimate—albeit unfulfilled—expectations of
opportunities. If these opportunities are continually hindered, LDCs will
feel increasingly disenchanted with SAFTA.
Capacity building in some of the above-mentioned areas does not
demand a high degree of capital. India is one of the most vocal
developing country members of the WTO and has ample expertise about
WTO rules-related issues, having the experience of participating in a
significant number of WTO disputes. Since the WTO’s inception, India
has invoked the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure in eighteen cases as
complainant and has participated as respondent in twenty cases.81 Among
the other contracting parties, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have invoked the
dispute settlement system as complainant in only one case each, and
Pakistan has done so in only three cases as complainant and two cases as
respondent.82 Because of India’s experience in WTO dispute settlement
and its relatively large pool of specialists, it should assume the lion’s
share of the burden of increasing the human capital of the LDC
contracting parties. The developing contracting parties should apportion
their budgetary responsibilities and specify their plans to realize the
objectives aimed at trade capacity building of LDC contracting parties as
mentioned in SAFTA.
Admittedly, all SAFTA contracting parties can seek legal assistance
on WTO rules from the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL), a
Geneva-based intergovernmental organization, either by being a member
of the same or through special privileges as LDCs.83 However, the

80
Sri Lanka Dep’t of Commerce, Areas identified for Technical Assistance to Least Developed
Contracting States Under Article 11(d) of SAFTA Agreement, Aug. 31 – Sept. 3, 2005, available at
http://www.doc.gov.lk/web/southasian_freetrade_technical.php (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
81
WTO,
Dispute
Settlement:
Disputes
by
Country/Territory,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
82
Id.
83
For ACWL’s mandate and scope, see The Agreement Establishing the Advisory Centre on
WTO Law, Nov. 30, 1999, 2299 U.N.T.S. 249; for a list of countries eligible for ACWL assistance ,
see ACWL: Members, http://www.acwl.ch/e/members/members.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
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ACWL charges fees for some of its services.84 In addition, when both
parties to a dispute relating to WTO rules approach the ACWL for
advice, to avoid any conflict of interest the ACWL advises only the party
that approached it first.85 This aspect of the ACWL’s modus operandi has
at times been cleverly used by some member states that have approached
the organization simply to deny the opposing party any chance of being
served by the ACWL in the same case.86 More importantly, the mandate
of the ACWL is essentially limited to the role of providing assistance
regarding WTO rules and procedure. Therefore, the ACWL cannot be a
proxy for the trade capacity building of LDC contracting parties of
SAFTA, as SAFTA’s envisioned scope of capacity building is much
more extensive than the ACWL’s scope of activities.
6) SAFTA does not regulate export control
SAFTA does not contain any provision relating to the control of
exports between the contracting parties. Generally, export prohibitions in
PTAs do not attract much attention either in the negotiation for PTAs or
in scholarly literature, as they are commonly perceived to hurt the
interests of imposing countries more than the countries resorting to them.
However, although export control would directly limit the income of the
domestic producers, it may also have negative impacts on the potential
importing countries. This may happen in a number of ways. The
producers of importing countries may rely on imported inputs for use in
their production chains. A country may rely on imports simply because
its domestic industry may not produce sufficient similar products to meet
national demand. Import of technological products may be critical for
improving the efficiency of production process.
Some advanced economies may employ export control more often
for strategic rather than trade-related purposes, as these states have an
interest in limiting access to technologies that are potentially
compromising to their national security.87 It is understandable that by
84

Mgmt. Board of the Advisory Ctr. on WTO Law, Billing Policy and Revised Time Budget,
ACWL/MB/D/2004/3
(Mar.
26,
2004),
available
at
http://www.acwl.ch/e/documents/time_budget_e.pdf.
85
Frieder Roessler, Exec. Dir., Advisory Ctr. on WTO Law, Lecture at the Sydney Law
School: Developing Countries in WTO Dispute Settlement (Mar. 23, 2010).
86
Id.
87
See Mitchel B. Wallerstein, Losing Controls- How U.S. Export Restrictions Jeopardize
National Security and Harm Competitiveness, 88 FOREIGN AFF. 11, 12 (2009) (discussing recent
export control policy in the United States and arguing for controls to be used more discriminately);
Joanna Bonarriva, Michelle Koscielski & Edward Wilson, Export Controls: An Overview of Their
Use, Economic Effects, and Treatment in the Global Trading System 3-5 (Aug. 2009) (U.S. Int’l
Trade
Comm’n,
Working
Paper
No.
ID-23,
2009),
available
at
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/working_papers/ID-23.pdf (outlining the general types of
export controls and their economic and noneconomic effects).
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agreeing to a PTA, SAFTA contracting parties would not be prepared to
compromise their right to impose export control that they may think
jeopardize national security.
However, this issue of export control may have the economic
implication of inhibiting internal trade between the parties, because the
contracting parties—particularly India—typically resort to export bans to
counter temporary surges in the prices of essential foodstuffs.88 However,
the economic rationale of temporary bans on exports to lower the prices
in a domestic market is dubious, as passing on the benefit of supposedly
lower costs to consumers remains a difficult exercise.89 In recognition of
the necessity of cooperation among member countries in this regard,
SAARC member countries have signed an agreement providing for the
establishment of a SAARC Food Bank to serve as a sub-regional food
security stock for the member countries.90 It would be wise if they
adopted rules proscribing total ban or excessive export taxes for
foodstuffs destined for other contracting parties.
C. SAFTA and Anti-dumping Measures
1) Increased anti-dumping measures may impede regional trade
Once trade between the contracting parties expands in volume, it is
likely that anti-dumping measures will consistently target sub-regional
producers. Hence, the current low prevalence of trade remedy measures
in intra-SAFTA trade is not a reliable indication of what may happen in
the medium or long term. Furthermore, conducting anti-dumping
investigations requires formal expertise in trade administration matters,
as can be inferred from the anti-dumping statistics. Since the formation
of the WTO, no LDC thus far has initiated any anti-dumping
investigations or adopted any anti-dumping measures.91 It is the member
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development92 and large developing countries like Brazil, China, Egypt,
88

M. Rafiqul Islam & Md. Rizwanul Islam, The Global Food Crisis and Lacklustre
Agricultural Trade Liberalisation: Demystifying their Nexus Underpinning Reform, 10 J. WORLD
INVESTMENT & TRADE 679, 684 (2009).
89
Bonarriva et al., supra note 87, at 4-5.
90
Agreement on Establishing the SAARC Food Bank, pmbl., art. II, Apr. 3, 2007, available at
http://www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/FoodBank.doc.
91
See Anti-dumping Initiations, supra note 41; Anti-dumping Measures, supra note 41. See
generally WTO Comm. on Anti-dumping Practices, Reports under Article 16.4 of the Agreement:
Note by the Secretariat, G/ADP/N/182- G/ADP/N/198 (Feb. 19, 2009 - Mar. 15, 2010) (monthly
WTO anti-dumping reports).
92
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development currently has 33 member
countries including Australia, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. For a full list, see Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., Member Countries,
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India, and South Africa that are the frequent users of anti-dumping
measures.93 However, these statistics do not capture the use of antidumping measures in proportion to the volume of total imports. In other
words, developed countries and large developing countries may have
resorted to anti-dumping measures more than LDCs because they engage
in more trade. However, given that a corporation must have significant
market power to engage in dumping, it is likely that producers in the
economically advanced countries are better positioned to engage in
dumping. It is also probable that LDCs are prevented from resorting to
anti-dumping measures because of their lack of institutional capacity and
sufficient market power. Therefore, it appears likely that if the national
trade expertise base matures, and the market power of corporations in
LDCs increases, the LDCs will resort to anti-dumping measures in intraPTA trade.
While trade remedy measures such as anti-dumping and
countervailing duties are supposed reactions to the unfair trade practices
of exporters, in practice they are often protectionist devices. The danger
of their pervasive usage is aggravated in tough financial times, as
governments often bow to the protectionist demands of their domestic
industries. For instance, during the recent financial crisis—from July to
December 2008—the WTO Secretariat noted that its member states
initiated seventeen percent more anti-dumping investigations than during
the same period in the previous year.94 Doctrinally, when governments
pursue a PTA they express a desire to expand intra-regional trade, and
trade remedy measures against PTA partners are antithetical to the
commitment of the internal trade liberalization.95 Hence, it would be
ideal if SAFTA abolished all forms of anti-dumping measures in intraSAFTA trade. However, in view of the current prevalence of antidumping measures in SAFTA, this does not seem likely. But even if the
contracting parties fall short of agreeing on total elimination of antidumping measures in intra-SAFTA trade, there might still be a number
of ways for them to curb the scope of such measures.

http://www.oecd.org/countrieslist/0,3351,en_33873108_33844430_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited
Oct. 26, 2010).
93
Anti-dumping Measures, supra note 41.
94
Press Release, WTO, Anti-dumping: WTO Secretariat Reports Increase in New Antidumping
Investigations
(May
7,
2009),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres09_e/pr556_e.htm.
95
See Comm. on Reg’l Trade Agreements, Synopsis of "Systemic" Issues Related to Regional
Trade Agreements, ¶ 58(a), WT/REG/W/37 (Mar. 2, 2000); Comm. on Reg’l Trade Agreements,
Note on the Meetings of 27 Nov. and 4-5 Dec. 1997, ¶ 26, WT/REG/M/15 (Jan. 13, 1998); Comm.
on Reg’l Trade Agreements, Communication from Australia, ¶ 21, WT/REG/W/18, (Nov. 17, 1997).
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2) Increasing the dumping margin threshold to discourage antidumping investigation
If the dumping margin threshold were increased it would discourage
anti-dumping investigations. The WTO’s anti-dumping agreement—the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement)—provides that if
the investigating authorities find that the margin of dumping is less than
two percent of the export price, the investigation will not proceed.96 If
SAFTA provides a higher threshold of dumping margin for exports from
one contracting party to another, sub-regional exporters will benefit.
Article 5.8 of Anti-Dumping Agreement also provides that anti-dumping
investigations should cease with respect to a particular country if its
dumped imports comprise less than three percent of the importing
member’s like-product imports.97 Any higher threshold for imports from
SAFTA would exempt their exporters from anti-dumping investigations.
This would ensure that importers from the contracting parties with
nominal market share will not have to bear the costs of defending antidumping investigations.
Article 8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement further provides that if an
exporter under investigation for anti-dumping activities submits an
assurance that export prices will be increased to wipe out the alleged
dumping, the investigations may be discontinued.98 Currently, however,
the importing member is not obliged to accept the price assurance. By
incorporating a provision for the mandatory acceptance of price
undertaking by SAFTA exporters, SAFTA would assist the exporters as
well as save the time and resources of the anti-dumping investigation
authority.
Finally, Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that
any anti-dumping duty must not be maintained for more than five years
from the imposition or five years after the most recent review, unless the
relevant authorities determine that termination of the duty would likely
cause recurrence of the dumping.99 SAFTA members may provide that
an anti-dumping duty imposed against any other SAFTA member must
be terminated within a shorter period. The contracting parties of some
96
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, art. 5.8, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19adp.pdf [hereinafter Anti-Dumping Argeement].
97
The exception to this is when countries whose dumped imports individually account for less
than three percent of an importing Member’s like-product imports, but collectively account for more
than seven percent. See id.
98
Id. art. 8.1.
99
Id. art. 11.3.
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PTAs among developing countries—namely the Andean Community, the
Caribbean Community, the Central American Common Market, the
Common Market of the Southern Cone, and the Union Économique et
Monétaire Ouest-Africaine—have taken one or more of the above steps
in this direction to provide momentum to the expansion of intra-regional
trade.100 Admittedly, these PTAs are customs unions and SAFTA at this
stage is merely a free trade agreement under the Enabling Clause.
However, SAFTA contracting parties have the goal of progressively
integrating into an economic union.101 Hence, they should either
eliminate anti-dumping duties in their internal trade or make special
concessions for anti-dumping measures as have the above-mentioned
PTAs.
3) Do special rules for anti-dumping measures against PTA
partners have the potential to violate the Most Favored Nation
rule?
Theoretically, it is possible to argue that providing for any of these
special provisions for limiting anti-dumping duties in intra-SAFTA trade
would constitute special favors and violate the Most Favored Nation rule.
However, the textual basis for such an argument appears to be rather
fragile. This is because anti-dumping duties are inherently
discriminatory. A country chooses to proceed with investigations against
exporters based upon the reported complaints of their unfair trading
practices. Whereas Article XXIV of GATT does not authorize WTO
members to give any special concession in anti-dumping investigations,
it also does not contain any proscription against doing so.102
Again, there is nothing in the Anti-Dumping Agreement that can be
construed to impose such a non-discriminatory obligation on PTA
parties.103 Rather, the language of Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement suggests that a country adopting anti-dumping duties does in
fact possess some discretionary powers.104 This article requires that if an
anti-dumping duty is imposed, it will have to be collected on a nondiscriminatory basis from the imports of all sources that are found to
have dumped, except from imports of those sources from which price
100

Robert Teh et al., Trade Remedy Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements, in REGIONAL
RULES IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM (Antoni Estevadeordal, Kati Suominen, & Robert Teh
eds., 2009).
101
Declaration of the Eleventh SAARC Summit, ¶ 1, Jan. 4-6, 2002; Declaration of the Twelfth
SAARC Summit, ¶ 3, Jan. 4-6, 2004; Declaration of the Thirteenth SAARC Summit, ¶ 14, Nov. 13,
2005, Declaration of the Fourteenth SAARC Summit, ¶ 18, Apr. 3-4, 2007; all available at
http://www.saarc-sec.org/SAARC-Summit/7/ (follow hyperlinks to respective declaration).
102
See Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 96.
103
See id.
104
Id. art. 9.2.
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undertakings have been accepted. Thus, a WTO member state cannot
levy disparate anti-dumping duties, but even during the investigation
stage it may exempt any exporter by accepting the party’s price
undertaking. This shows, a fortiori, the scope of discretion that a WTO
member may exercise in conducting anti-dumping investigations.
Therefore, it does not appear that special anti-dumping rules for intraSAFTA trade, such as those suggested here, would violate any rules of
the WTO.
D. The Benefits of Tackling Subsidies in a PTA Are Difficult to
Determine
Some recent PTAs have attempted to restrict the use of subsidies in
intra-PTA trade by providing that parties will eliminate—and will not reintroduce—export subsidies on products destined for other partner
countries.105 However, some types of subsidies cannot always be
selectively applied. For instance, if a domestic industry is provided with
input subsidies at the time of production with the aim of boosting that
export, it would hurt competing industries in all other trading partners. It
is difficult to conceive how such subsidies would not apply to exports
sent to PTA partners. Hence, in the absence of multilateral rules, there
appears to be very little that SAFTA contracting parties can do to
eliminate subsidies in intra-SAFTA trade other than to require goods
destined for other contracting parties to not be eligible for any form of
express export subsidies. Any SAFTA disciplines on countervailing
duties may not be feasible.
In these ways, one can see that the over- and under-regulation of
many areas of trade law by SAFTA leaves its own parties much less
likely to take full advantage of the natural trade potential.
IV. THE NECESSITY OF MOVING BEYOND DIRECT TRADE
MEASURES
To make SAFTA more effective, contracting parties must move
beyond direct trading measures and make fundamental changes to
SAFTA. These changes should include attracting Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) to industrialize their economies, inserting a dispute
105
See, e.g., Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area, ch.
2, art. 3, Feb. 27, 2009, AUSTRALIA DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, available at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/fta/asean/aanzfta/contents.html; Free Trade Agreement Between the
Government of New Zealand and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, China-N.Z.,
ch. 6, art. 63, Apr. 7, 2008, available at http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/1-The-agreement/2-Text-of-theagreement/index.php.
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settlement clause, creating a sub-regional competition policy framework,
and marshaling trade-negotiating resources by establishing a permanent
body of trade negotiation experts.
A. SAARC Should Use SAFTA to Attract Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI)
Expert opinion on the ability of FDI to influence economic
development varies sharply. Many arguments against FDI are principally
arguments against employing lax regulations to attract FDI, not against
the desirability of attracting FDI per se. Skepticism has been voiced that
stiff competition among developing countries may spur a race to the
bottom; that is, countries with lax environmental regulations might
attract more FDI.106 However, it is undeniable that increased flow of FDI
creates jobs and may increase trade performance.107 With chronic
shortages of domestic capital, SAFTA contracting parties need to attract
FDI to industrialize their economies.
SAFTA contracting parties should formulate sub-regional rules to
protect FDI for progressive economic integration. Although the impact of
setting up a legal framework to protect FDI in a PTA is mixed and
complex,108 a comprehensive sub-regional framework would not likely
harm the SAARC sub-region’s standing as a favorable host of FDI. Such
an initiative would also help to materialize SAARC’s aspired goal of
eliminating barriers to intra-SAARC investments.109
A primary concern for developing countries and LDCs is that being
an agenda of capital-exporting countries, any such agreement promotes
their own interests to the detriment of the host countries.110 However,
SAFTA contracting parties are not capital-exporting countries, so this
concern should not be an element in their sub-regional forums.
Additionally, if any dispute arises relating to FDI from an investor of
another SAFTA contracting party, it should be subject to SAFTA’s
dispute settlement procedures. The contracting parties may formulate
106
See generally H. JEFFREY LEONARD, POLLUTION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
PRODUCT: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, ENVIRONMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE
ADVANTAGE (1988) (arguing that the strictness of environmental regulations in developed countries
such as the United States has incentivized many industries to relocate their operations to less
developed countries with fewer regulations).
107
See M. RAFIQUL ISLAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW OF THE WTO 500 (2006).
108
See generally United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2009, The Role of
International Investment Agreements in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to Developing
Countries, art. III, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/5 (describing how preferential trade and
investment agreements affect the flow of FDI into developing countries).
109
SAFTA, supra note 2, art. 8(h).
110
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & ANDREW CHARLTON, FAIR TRADE FOR ALL: HOW TRADE CAN
PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT 150 (2005); see ISLAM, supra note 107, at 498-99.
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rules on settling FDI-related disputes, limiting them to the investors
within the sub-region.
It may be argued that once an agreement is in place to protect subregional investors, SAFTA contracting parties may be pressed by big
businesses from third-party countries to extend similar treatment to them.
However, that line of argument does not appear to be persuasive based
on the abundance of agreement templates already in place for protecting
FDI. Indeed, all but two SAFTA contracting parties are parties to at least
one bilateral investment treaty.111 Afghanistan has signed bilateral
investment treaties with three countries, Bangladesh with twenty-eight
countries, India with seventy-eight countries, Nepal with four countries,
Pakistan with forty-seven countries, and Sri Lanka with twenty-seven
countries.112 Though only four of these bilateral investment treaties are
between SAFTA contracting parties,113 the remaining bilateral
investment treaties involve countries of varying economic power from
LDCs to developed countries. More significantly, a study by the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development shows that in 2009 at
least four SAFTA contracting parties114 were subjected to state versus
investor dispute settlement claims.115 This implies that they may be
willing to embrace a binding sub-regional investment mechanism
providing for state versus investor dispute settlement.
B. SAFTA Should Include an FDI Settlement Dispute Clause
To ease concerns, promote confidence among investors, and avoid
diplomatic tussle among SAFTA contracting parties, a SAFTA provision
should be drafted whereby any individual investor from the sub-region
can bring a claim against a contracting party in a sub-regional dispute
settlement forum. The provision can be modeled after NAFTA’s Chapter
11. Such a provision would help to de-politicize the process of dispute
settlement and tone down any potential diplomatic rows that often

111

The two exceptions are Bhutan and the Maldives. See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV.
(UNCTAD),
Country-specific
Lists
of
BITs,
June
1,
2010,
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2344&lang=1 (follow “select one country”
drop-down menu).
112
Id.
113
Id. (agreements between Bangladesh and India; Bangladesh and Pakistan; India and Sri
Lanka; and Pakistan and Sri Lanka).
114
Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. See United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, Latest Developments in Investor–State Dispute Settlement: IIA Issues Note No. 1
(2010): International Investment Agreements, 13, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/3,
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20103_en.pdf.
115
Id.
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surface in state-versus-state dispute settlement.116 However, unlike the
NAFTA model, SAFTA should not provide for ad hoc arbitration panels
to settle investment disputes. Dispute settlements by ad hoc panels are
fraught with the peril of breeding uncertain rulings. The ad hoc panels
should be replaced with a permanent panel of arbiters that will specialize
in investment disputes, thus giving more stability to the arbitration
process.
SAFTA contracting parties have signed the Agreement for
Establishment of SAARC Arbitration Council (SAC Agreement) to set
up an arbitration council (Council),117 but it is unclear whether, under
this agreement, a third-party investor can directly bring a claim against a
SAFTA member. The SAC Agreement is ambiguous and has yet to take
force. It appears that the application of the SAC Agreement will be
limited to the investors of the contracting parties, since the preamble
notes that the contracting parties are “[d]esirous of creating conditions
favourable for fostering greater investment by investors of one Member
State in the territory of another Member State” (emphasis omitted).118
However, there is nothing in the SAC Agreement to imply that nonSAFTA investors would be able to invoke any of its provisions. The
proposed Council, headed by the Director-General, is entrusted with the
responsibility of maintaining a list of those who may act as arbitrators for
settling investment disputes.119 The SAC Agreement in its current form
does not contain any provision as to whether a foreign investor can
directly bring a claim against a contracting party.
SAFTA is also unclear about whether a corporate entity can bring a
claim against a SAFTA country. Because the details still need to be
solidified, it is anticipated that strong opposition may be voiced by some
domestic interest groups or courts against giving an investor the right to
bring a claim against a member country, as that would mean that a
corporate entity could bring a claim directly against a SAFTA
contracting party. However, in the domestic legal setting, individuals and
corporate actors can litigate against the government, and some of the
contracting parties have provided for similar rights for foreign investors.
Since this is not a novel idea, the state versus investor dispute settlement
may not appear to be such an odd thing.

116
See Michael Ewing-Chow, Investor Protection in Free Trade Agreements: Lessons from
North America, 5 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 748, 767 (2001).
117
Agreement for Establishment of SAARC Arbitration Council, Nov. 13, 2005, available at
http://www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/AgreementforestablishmentofSAARCArbitrationCouncil.doc.
118
Id. pmbl.
119
Id. art. II-III.
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For example, Mexico agreed to a state versus state dispute settlement
procedure. Mexico had a long-standing history of investment disputes
with the United States and so it incorporated the Calvo Doctrine,
essentially demanding that aliens engaged in commercial activities in the
territory of another country rely on the rules of that country for all
commercial matters and not involve their native country in espousing
claims on behalf of its citizens.120 Nonetheless, neither the long history of
disputes nor the dogmatic adherence to the Calvo Doctrine stood in the
way of agreeing to a common set of investment rules in NAFTA. Rather,
Mexico wanted to project itself as a secure destination for foreign
investors.121 Likewise, SAFTA contracting parties, by establishing a state
versus investor dispute settlement rule, may create a good impression
that may counteract—albeit to a limited extent—the sub-region’s bad
name for political upheavals.
C. SAFTA Should Include a Competition Policy
To ensure countries will benefit from free trade, SAFTA should
include a competition policy to prevent the rise of anti-competitive
practices. One of the basic objectives of trade liberalization is to increase
the choices of goods and services and decrease consumer prices by
increasing competition among businesses. However, the anti-competitive
practices of businesses may nullify or circumscribe the benefits of free
trade that consumers could otherwise enjoy.122 By engaging in
monopolistic and oligopolistic practices, big businesses with
disproportionate market share may abuse their market power and capture
the benefits of trade liberalization—rather than the consumers who are
the intended beneficiaries.123 Competition policies complement the trade
liberalization’s objective of maintaining an efficient market that benefits
consumers.
Though the WTO has not been able to implement a competition
policy, developing countries are likely to agree to competition rules in
PTAs. The issue of incorporating a universal competition agreement in
the WTO has been so divisive that the General Council made a decision
120
Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge?: Developing the
International Rule of Law under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 193, 194 & n.5 (2001).
121
Frederick M. Abbott, NAFTA and the Legalization of World Politics: A Case Study, 54
INT’L ORG. 519, 531-33 (2000).
122
M. Rafiqul Islam, A WTO Multilateral Framework for Competition Policy and TradeInduced Development: Debunking their Complementarity in Developing Countries, 5 J. WORLD INV.
& TRADE 491, 494 (2004).
123
See id. (arguing that multinational corporations have gained power and their monopolistic
tendencies may have a negative impact in the marketplace).
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that no work towards negotiations on competition policies would occur
within the WTO during the Doha Round Negotiations.124 Many
developing countries in the WTO resist the formulation of multilateral
competition rules at the WTO but take a markedly different stance when
it comes to competition policies in PTAs. A recent survey of sixty-eight
PTAs involving developing countries found that fifty of those
agreements include a competition policy.125 This divergence in approach
may partially be attributed to the fact that the focus of competition rules
within the WTO framework focuses more on ensuring competitive
market access (which favors business from developed countries that are
operating in developing countries) than on the promotion of fair
competition among all businesses.126 Moreover, the divergence in the
economic size of the WTO member states makes it difficult to find
common ground in competition matters. However, it may be surmised
that SAFTA contracting parties will not have much difficulty
incorporating a sub-regional competition policy framework. Indeed, the
text of SAFTA expresses an aspiration for promoting competition within
the SAARC area.
One of the main objectives of SAFTA is “promoting conditions of
fair competition in the free trade area….”127 However, the agreement
includes no specific means for reaching this objective. A sub-regional
competition policy framework could be the vehicle to ensure this aim is
realized. Though it may not be feasible to immediately frame a supranational, sub-regional competition authority to regulate and enforce
common competition policies formulated within SAARC, a sub-regional
body could initially play an advisory role. In this capacity it could
formulate a model competition framework for the contracting parties.
Additionally, it could assist the contracting parties in investigating
alleged cases of anti-competitive practices. A sub-regional competition
policy framework would be compatible with the desire to increase trade
among SAFTA contracting parties.
D. SAARC Can Use SAFTA for Coalition Building in Global
Trade Negotiations

124
WTO Gen. Council, Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the General Council on
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125
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eds., 2009).
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Member countries can use SAFTA to promote their interests in
global trade negotiations. The trade promotion initiative of a PTA is not
necessarily limited to the confines of its parties’ internal trade. Recently,
PTAs have been used to form coalitions for increasing the leverage of
individual member countries in WTO negotiations.128 Even members of
the European Commission, despite being advanced economies, have
found it helpful to marshal their trade-negotiating resources and now
conduct much of their WTO-related activities by the European
Commission rather than by individual countries.129 When a group of
WTO member states takes a concerted position on an issue that other
WTO members do not agree with, it becomes difficult for the latter to
outright reject the former’s voice.130 Thus, the other members may
attenuate their position or give concessions in another area.131 A group’s
collective position also improves its chances of representation in those
issues where only a few of its parties negotiate. Hence, a coalition of
SAFTA contracting parties in the WTO would likely be better positioned
in negotiations than each country would be individually. As developing
countries and LDCs, there are a number of areas where SAFTA
contracting parties’ interests converge in WTO negotiations. Admittedly,
SAFTA contracting parties compete in areas, like textiles, where they vie
for access to third-party markets. However, SAFTA contracting parties
must be careful not to allow the few areas of competing interests to
undermine their cooperation in areas where their interests converge.
SAFTA contracting parties have more or less a common stance on many
issues, such as advocating for stronger protection of traditional
knowledge, geographical indication on products,132 and the elimination
of agricultural subsidies, as well as fighting for the prevention of new
multilateral agreements on investment and competition within the WTO,
linkage of trade and non-trade social issues like labor rights, and the
involvement of non-governmental organizations in WTO procedures.133
Additionally, as developing countries and LDCs, SAFTA contracting
128
Edward D. Mansfield & Eric Reinhardt, Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The
Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements, 57 INT’L ORG. 829,
838 (2003).
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See Gregory Shaffer, The Challenges of WTO Law: Strategies for Developing Country
Adaptation, 5 World Trade Rev. 177, 188 (2006).
130
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Rev. 423, 435 (2008).
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parties are frequently subjected to excessive quarantines and
environmental measures in the markets of developed economies.
Proposed carbon tariffs to tackle climate change—as suggested by some
from developed countries134—could potentially be an issue where all
SAFTA contracting parties have a common stand. Because of their
limited resources, it is likely that many industries of SAFTA contracting
parties would have difficulty in changing production patterns. As
exporters they would be disproportionately subjected to such carbon
tariffs.
There are other trade issues where the interests of the contracting
parties may converge. One example is the proposed Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement that includes very stringent measures to punish
infringement of intellectual property rights.135 While the infringement of
intellectual property rights may be sanctioned by tougher international
treaty rules, there are apprehensions among some analysts that this
agreement may go too far.136 Of particular concern to them is the
prospect that the proposed instrument may negatively impact the
legitimate trade of generic drugs.137 As net-importers of intellectual
property products, the contracting parties may take a common position
against the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement.
It is difficult for SAFTA countries—particularly the LDCs—to
negotiate individually with developed countries. However, SAFTA
contracting parties can collectively set up a sub-regional database of
unjustified quarantines and environmental measures that their producers
face in developed markets. South Asian industries can submit
information to this database about the unjustified barriers they face in
their export markets. Based on the analysis of the data collated, SAFTA
contracting parties can negotiate with those economies that resort to
using unjustified trade barriers. By acting as a single entity in this
manner, it is probable that contracting parties would elicit better
outcomes than acting individually. But in view of the modest collective
clout of the contracting parties in global terms, even their allied stance
134
See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Fetishizing Free Trade, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 2009,
available at http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/11/fetishizing-free-trade/.
135
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(outlining the objective and structure of the Agreement).
136
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may not be enough to enable them to reach every outcome to which they
might aspire. To achieve their desired goals, they may need to coordinate
with other WTO members or groups with similar interests. But even in
such cases, concerted action by SAFTA contracting parties is likely to
make the coordination easier and more effective than isolated endeavors
of individual contracting parties alone.
To effectively negotiate as a group, SAFTA must establish a
permanent body of recognized trade negotiation experts to devise
common policies for WTO negotiations. If financial resources constrain
the establishment of a permanent body, SAFTA may need to initially
vest the current COE with this responsibility. However, the COE is a
dispute-settlement body and should eventually be composed of
independent arbiters. The responsibility of identifying issues of
collective interest and drawing up common positions on those issues is
essentially a diplomatic task. Therefore, persons with competence in
diplomacy and negotiations should be sought. SAFTA should create a
common fund that, over time, can bear the expense of establishing a
permanent body to direct common policy coordination for the
multilateral trade forum.
V. CONCLUSION
The South Asian Free Trade Agreement has tremendous potential to
improve the economic and political welfare of its member countries.
However, its effectiveness is currently weak due to bilateral PTAs, which
bypass its authority, and because SAFTA’s under- and over-regulates
important issues. By working together, member countries may overcome
both of these obstacles and achieve SAFTA’s original goals.
To make SAFTA a fully functioning agreement, contracting parties
must first terminate existing bilateral PTAs among themselves. However,
since these PTAs provide contracting parties with strong financial
incentives, this step is implausible until (1) SAFTA is modified to
provide the benefits that drove contracting parties to create bilateral
PTAs, and (2) SAFTA is strengthened by changing its current terms that
are either under- or over-regulative.
One major benefit contracting parties would gain in making these
changes would be the reduction in the administrative burden on custom
authorities from the plethora of bilateral PTAs. Businesses would also
benefit from doing business in a less complex trade regime. While some
businesses may fear losing bilateral agreement benefits, their
apprehension should be adequately addressed if SAFTA offers identical
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market access benefits. Undeniably, some inefficient producers hitherto
benefiting from bilateral PTAs might have to re-allocate their resources
in view of the competition from other SAFTA producers. Nevertheless,
that type of re-allocation of resources is the central point of any trade
liberalization scheme. By eliminating bilateral PTAs between contracting
parties, discrimination between SAFTA producers would be put to an
end. Those businesses that are currently not enjoying benefits of bilateral
PTAs should petition their governments to eliminate those treaties.
To increase the movement of goods across borders it is critical that
the contracting parties put in place an integrated transport network. Trade
co-operation initiatives should not be limited to the confines of their subregional forum; the sub-regional market—no matter how expansive and
integrated—cannot be a substitute for the global market. The contracting
parties would benefit from extending their collective resources to the
negotiations of the WTO. A concerted SAFTA trade body would ensure
better outcomes for the contracting parties than anything they could
attain individually. Taking these vital steps will ensure that SAFTA is
both internationally respected and economically effective.
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